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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After being charged with two counts of aiding and abetting trafficking in
methamphetamine, Richard Wilson exercised his constitutional right to a jury trial. He was
found guilty as charged, and received an aggregate sentence of ten years, with three years fixed.
On appeal, in what appears to be an issue of first impression for the appellate courts in
Idaho, he asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction of
aiding and abetting trafficking by represented amount (Count II), because the State failed to
establish that Mr. Wilson knew that his accomplice was representing the controlled substance to
be “one ounce” or more. Additionally, the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support
Mr. Wilson’s conviction on Count II where the State failed to establish that his alleged
accomplice affirmatively represented she was selling one ounce of methamphetamine. Finally,
the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support Mr. Wilson’s convictions as to both
counts where the State failed to establish that Mr. Wilson knew the substance the alleged
accomplice sold on the two occasions was methamphetamine.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
At approximately six o’clock in the evening on April 7, 2016, law enforcement made a
controlled drug buy from Regina Jones. (2/28/17 Trial Tr., p.178, Ls.2-24; p.179, L.24 – p.180,
L.1.) Richard Wilson was there with Ms. Jones at a Target store parking lot, and was standing
outside a white SUV with the hood up. (2/28/17 Trial Tr., p.179, L.21 – p.182, L.4.) Ms. Jones
got out of the SUV and into the undercover officer’s car to deliver the methamphetamine.
(2/28/17 Trial Tr., p.182, Ls.14-15.) Mr. Wilson waited outside by the SUV—he was not in the
car during the transaction, and he did not speak to the officer who obtained the
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methamphetamine from Ms. Jones. (2/28/17 Trial Tr., p.190, L.23 – p.191, L.3; 3/1/17 Trial
Tr., p.80, L.23 – p.81, L.9; p.95, L.24 – p.96, L.9.) The undercover officer purchased nearly two
ounces of methamphetamine from Ms. Jones. (2/28/17 Trial Tr., p.182, Ls.18-20; 3/1/17 Trial
Tr., p.21, Ls.13-25.) The package obtained on April 7, 2016 from Ms. Jones weighed 55.65
grams. (3/1/17 Trial Tr., p.21, Ls.13-25.)
Twenty days later, on April 27, 2016, the same officer purchased close to an ounce of
additional methamphetamine from Ms. Jones. (2/28/17 Trial Tr., p.211, L.15 – p.212, L.25.)
This time the parties met in the McDonald’s parking lot, and Mr. Wilson drove Ms. Jones there
in a blue Nissan. (3/1/17 Trial Tr., p.94, Ls.1-21.) Again, he put the hood up on the vehicle, and
Ms. Jones got into the officer’s car to exchange the methamphetamine for money. (2/28/17 Trial
Tr., p.215, L.7 - p.216, L.5.) Again, Mr. Wilson waited outside the car during the transaction.
(3/1/17 Trial Tr., p.94, Ls.10-15; p.96, Ls.10-20.) After Mr. Wilson and Ms. Jones drove away
from the second transaction, officers stopped the vehicle and $600 of the marked bills were
found on Mr. Wilson. (3/1/17 Trial Tr., p.100, L.7 – p.104, L.22; p.127, L.17 – p.128, L.22.) An
additional package of methamphetamine was located on Ms. Jones’ person when she was
searched. (3/1/17 Trial Tr., p.108, L.4 – p.109, L.12.)
The package the undercover officer purchased from Ms. Jones during the second
controlled buy contained a substance that tested positive for methamphetamine, and weighed
25.91 grams. (3/1/17 Trial Tr., p.32, Ls.1-17.)
Mr. Wilson was charged by Indictment with two counts of aiding and abetting trafficking
in methamphetamine. (R., pp.7-8.)
A two-day jury trial was held. (See 2/28/17 Trial Tr., 3/1/17 Trial Tr.)

2

At trial, Detective Phillips testified that he was contacted by Ms. Jones who offered to
sell him two ounces of methamphetamine. (2/28/17 Trial Tr., p.179, Ls.4-18.) The second time
he asked her for methamphetamine, he asked her for one ounce. (2/28/17 Trial Tr., p.212, Ls.810.)
Sergeant Shane Huston, who watched both transactions from several cars away, testified
that the male that arrived with Ms. Jones on April 7, 2016 was not in the vehicle where Detective
Phillips was doing the drug deal with Ms. Jones, and his voice was not heard over the wire.
(3/1/17 Trial Tr., p.90, Ls.1-7; p.95, L.24 – p.96, L.9.) Sergeant Huston also testified that
Mr. Wilson was not in the vehicle with Detective Phillips and Ms. Jones when the drug deal was
happening on April 27, 2016, and he did not hear another male’s voice over the wire during that
deal. (3/1/17 Trial Tr., p.96, Ls.10-20.)
Corinna Owsley, a forensic scientist employed by the Idaho State Police Lab, testified
that the two plastic bags she analyzed contained methamphetamine. (3/1/17 Trial Tr., p.13, Ls.19; p.17, L.19 – p.24, L.8.) Ms. Owsley testified that the first set of two bags containing
methamphetamine weighed 27.76 grams and 27.89 grams. (3/1/17 Trial Tr., p.21, Ls.13-25.)
She testified that the bag obtained from Ms. Jones on April 27, 2016 contained
methamphetamine which weighed 25.91 grams. (3/1/17 Trial Tr., p.32, Ls.1-17.) Mr. Wilson
did not testify at his trial; however, his police interview was admitted into evidence and played to
the jury. (3/1/17 Trial Tr., p.149, Ls.21-24; State’s Exhibit No. 5.) Ms. Jones did not testify at
Mr. Wilson’s trial.
At the close of the State’s case, Mr. Wilson made a motion for acquittal as to Count II,
which charged Mr. Wilson with aiding and abetting trafficking an amount of methamphetamine
represented to be “one ounce.” (3/1/17 Trial Tr., p.145, Ls.8-20.) Mr. Wilson argued that the
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evidence was insufficient to prove an element of the crime—that the defendant represented the
amount of methamphetamine to be an ounce or more where the evidence in front of the Court
was that the amount of controlled substance was less than one ounce. (3/1/17 Trial Tr., p.145,
Ls.8-20.) The district court denied the motion. (3/1/17 Trial Tr., p.147, L.4 – p.148, L.20.)
During its deliberations, the jury had a question: “In Instruction # 14 and # 15, item 5.
Either: (a). . . (b): is the standard that simply 28 grams or 1 oz. represented was delivered, or,
does it mean Richard Wilson had to know it was 28 oz. [sic] represented as a(n) oz. or more.”1
(Augmentation, p.59.) The district court proposed to the parties that it would answer the jury by
writing, “What the defendant had to know is fully set forth in Jury Instruction #14 and #15.”
(3/1/17 Trial Tr., p.210, Ls.18-22.) Defense counsel objected and requested the answer to read,
“The applicable law is set forth in instruction 14 and 15.” (3/1/17 Trial Tr., p.211, Ls.1-4.) The
district court overruled the objection and answered the jury as follows, “What the defendant had
to know is fully set forth in Jury Instruction #14 and #15.” (3/1/17 Trial Tr., p.211, Ls.11-12;
Augmentation, p.60.)
The jury found Mr. Wilson guilty as charged. (R., pp.139-140.)
The district court then sentenced Mr. Wilson to ten years, with three years fixed, on each

1

The jury’s question was about the trafficking by represented amount element. Jury Instructions
Nos. 14 and 15 were the elements of trafficking, and section 5 provided:
5. Either:
(a) the quantity delivered was at least twenty-eight (28) grams of
methamphetamine or any mixture or substance with a detectable
amount of methamphetamine,
Or
(b) the quantity delivered was represented to be one ounce or more
of methamphetamine.
(Augmentation, pp.38-39 (JI Nos. 14, 15).)
4

count, to be served concurrently. (5/1/17 Tr., p.32, L.13 – p.33, L.6; R., pp.191-192.) The
sentences were concurrent with each count and concurrent with Mr. Wilson’s sentences in any
other cases. (5/1/17 Tr., p.32, L.5 – p.33, L.6; R., p.156.) A Judgment of Conviction was
entered on May 4, 2017. (R., pp.155-156.) On June 13, 2017, Mr. Wilson filed a Notice of
Appeal. (R., pp.157-161.)

5

ISSUE
Was there sufficient evidence to support Mr. Wilson’s convictions of two counts of aiding and
abetting trafficking in methamphetamine?
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ARGUMENT
There Was Insufficient Evidence To Convict Mr. Wilson Of Two Counts Of Aiding And
Abetting Trafficking In Methamphetamine
A.

Introduction
As a matter of first impression in Idaho, the issue presented here is whether, in order for

the jury to convict Mr. Wilson of aiding and abetting trafficking by represented amount, the State
was required to establish that Mr. Wilson knew that Ms. Jones was representing the controlled
substance to be “one ounce” or more. He contends that, where the amount of methamphetamine
Ms. Jones sold to the undercover officer was less than 28 grams, in order to prove Mr. Wilson
aided and abetted trafficking, the State was required to establish that Mr. Wilson knew Ms. Jones
represented the quantity she sold as “one ounce.”
A person may not be convicted of a crime absent sufficient evidence to support a finding,
by a reasonable trier of fact, that the State proved each element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. Because Mr. Wilson was charged with aiding and abetting trafficking by represented
amount, and the represented amount is an element of the offense, Mr. Wilson’s conviction
required his knowledge that Ms. Jones was selling the methamphetamine as a represented ounce.
If he did not have such knowledge, he could not be guilty of the offense, as aiding and abetting
requires a community of purpose—for him to have the same criminal intent as Ms. Jones. Where
her conviction required a representation in order to establish an element, the amount, as an aider
and abettor interchangeable with the principal, Mr. Wilson must have had knowledge of her
representation(s). Further, as another basis for vacating Mr. Wilson’s conviction on Count II, the
State failed to present substantial evidence that Ms. Jones represented the amount sold as “one
ounce.”
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Mr. Wilson also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of
both Counts I and II where the State failed to prove that Mr. Wilson knew the substance sold was
methamphetamine.
Because, as to Count II, the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that
Mr. Wilson knew the quantity of methamphetamine Ms. Jones represented to the undercover
officer and where Ms. Jones never represented a quantity to the undercover officer, and because,
as to both counts, the State failed to establish that Mr. Wilson knew the substance Ms. Jones was
purportedly selling was methamphetamine, this Court must vacate Mr. Wilson’s convictions of
both counts.

B.

There Was Insufficient Evidence To Convict Mr. Wilson Of Two Counts Of Aiding And
Abetting Trafficking In Methamphetamine
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence where a judgment of conviction has been

entered upon a jury verdict, the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict if there
is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the
prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Herrera–Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385 (Ct. App. 1998).
The appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of
the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn
from the evidence. State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 684 (Ct. App. 1985). The evidence is
considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Herrera–Brito, 131 Idaho at 385.

1.

The State Failed To Present Substantial Evidence That Mr. Wilson Aided And
Abetted In Trafficking By Represented Amount, As Alleged In Count II

The methamphetamine trafficking provision of the trafficking statute under which
Mr. Wilson was charged provides that:
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Any person who knowingly delivers, or brings into this state, or who is knowingly
in actual or constructive possession of, twenty-eight (28) grams or more of
methamphetamine or amphetamine or of any mixture or substance containing a
detectable amount of methamphetamine or amphetamine is guilty of a felony,
which felony shall be known as “trafficking in methamphetamine or
amphetamine.”
I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(4). The trafficking statute also states that, “For the purposes of subsections
(a) and (b) of this section the weight of the controlled substance as represented by the person
selling or delivering it is determinative if the weight as represented is greater than the actual
weight of the controlled substance.” I.C. § 37-2732B(c).
The State relied upon subsection (c) in prosecuting Mr. Wilson for trafficking, alleging
Ms. Jones represented the weight of the methamphetamine was one ounce (28.35 grams),
although the amount she delivered was less than twenty-eight grams (25.91 grams). (R., pp.7-8.)
At trial, the jury was instructed as to the elements of Count II:
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Aiding and Abetting Trafficking of
methamphetamine as charged in Count I, the state must prove:
1. On or about April 27, 2016
2. in the state of Idaho
3. the defendant aided and abetted Regina L. Jones in the delivery of
methamphetamine,
4. the defendant knew it was methamphetamine, and
5. Either:
(a) the quantity delivered was at least twenty-eight (28) grams of
methamphetamine or any mixture or substance with a detectable
amount of methamphetamine,
Or
(b) the quantity delivered was represented to be one ounce or more
of methamphetamine.
(Augmentation, p.39 (JI No. 15).) (reasonable doubt paragraph omitted).
The jury was also instructed on the representation theory:
9

Under Idaho law, the weight of the controlled substance as represented by the
person selling or delivering it is determinative if the weight as represented is
greater than the actual weight of the controlled substance.
(Augmentation, p.41 (JI No. 17).) Here, the amount sold on April 27, 2017, as charged in Count
II, was only 25.91 grams, and not one ounce (28.35 grams).

(3/1/17 Tr., p.32, Ls.1-17.)

Therefore, the State proceeded to try Mr. Wilson on the representation theory as to Count II.

a.

The State Failed To Present Substantial Evidence That Mr. Wilson
Knew The Quantity Of Methamphetamine Ms. Jones Represented
She Was Selling Or Delivering

In order to convict Ms. Jones of trafficking, the State would be required to prove that
Ms. Jones represented to Detective Phillips that she was selling him “one ounce” of
methamphetamine. Mr. Wilson asserts that, in order to convict him of aiding and abetting
Ms. Jones’ trafficking by represented amount, the State was required to prove that he knew
Ms. Jones was selling an amount represented to be one ounce. This it did not do.
At trial, the State’s witness testified that Mr. Wilson was not privy to any in-person
conversations between Ms. Jones and Detective Phillips. (3/1/17 Trial Tr., p.95, L.24 – p.96, L.9
(Sergeant Huston testified that the male that arrived with Ms. Jones on April 7, 2016 was not in
the vehicle where Detective Phillips was doing the drug deal with Ms. Jones, and his voice was
not heard over the wire); p.96, Ls.10-20 (Sergeant Huston testifying that Mr. Wilson was not in
the vehicle with Detective Phillips and Ms. Jones when the drug deal was happening on April 27,
2016, and he did not hear another male’s voice over the wire during that deal).) The State did
not introduce any evidence that Mr. Wilson ever communicated with Detective Phillips. When
interviewed, Mr. Wilson made no statements regarding the amount or even the type of drug
Ms. Jones was selling. (See State’s Exhibit No. 5.)
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At the close of the State’s case, Mr. Wilson made an I.C.R. 29 motion for acquittal on
both counts. (3/1/17 Trial Tr., p.145, L.8 – p.146, L.1.) As to Count II, which charged
Mr. Wilson with trafficking by representation, Mr. Wilson argued that the evidence was
insufficient to prove an element of the crime—that the defendant represented the amount of
methamphetamine to be an ounce or more where the evidence in front of the Court was that the
amount of controlled substance was less than one ounce. (3/1/17 Trial Tr., p.145, Ls.8-20.) In
denying the motion, the district court explained:
I did rule as a matter of first impression that with respect to a case like this where
there are two people involved, one is doing the delivering and one is aiding and
abetting, that the representations of the person doing the delivering as to the
quantity are attributable to the aider and abetter.
And I believe that’s consistent with the situation where you have a robbery with a
getaway driver and a person ends up being killed. So I don’t see much difference
between that and the aider and abetter. The witness is stuck with the
representations and they are attributable to him.
(3/1/17 Trial Tr., p.147, Ls.4-16.)

i.

The State Failed To Present Substantial Evidence That
Mr. Wilson Shared The Criminal Intent Of Ms. Jones—
That His Acts Had A “Community Of Purpose” And That
He “Shared The Criminal Intent Of The Principal” To
Traffic Where It Failed To Prove That Mr. Wilson Knew
The Amount Of Methamphetamine Ms. Jones Represented

The jury was instructed on aiding and abetting as follows:
All persons who participate in a crime either before or during its commission, by
intentionally aiding, abetting, facilitating, encouraging, and/or assisting another to
commit the crime with intent to promote or assist in its commission are guilty of
the crime. All such participants are considered principals in the commission of
the crime. The participation of each defendant in the crime must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Augmentation, p.42 (JI No. 18).) “To be an aider and abettor one must share the criminal intent
of the principal; there must be a community of purpose in the unlawful undertaking.”
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State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 716 P.2d 1152 (1985) (quoting State v. Duran, 526 P.2d 188,
189 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974)). The aider and abettor must have both the requisite intent and must
have acted in some manner to bring about the intended result. State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378,
383 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding sufficient evidence presented for jury to infer defendant knowingly
provided weapon with intent that it be used against someone during the robbery, thus, defendant
had requisite intent of a principal to commit aggravated battery).
While more than one person can commit acts constituting a single crime, the common
law made distinctions in classifying the parties to a crime depending upon the role they played.
2 W. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, § 13.1 at 326-28. (2d ed. 2003). Over time, these
distinctions became problematic and the Idaho Legislature enacted Idaho Code §§ 18-204, 191430, and 19-1431 to alleviate the confusion and complications caused by the distinctions. Idaho
thusly eliminated the distinctions between a principal in the first degree and an “aider and
abettor” in liability and in potential punishment. Idaho Code § 18-204 provides:
All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be felony or
misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense or
aid and abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and
encouraged its commission, or who, by fraud, contrivance, or force, occasion the
intoxication of another for the purpose of causing him to commit any crime, or
who, by threats, menaces, command or coercion, compel another to commit any
crime, are principals in any crime so committed.
I.C. § 18-204. Idaho Code § 19-1430 provides:
The distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal and between
principals in the first and second degree, in cases of felony, is abrogated; and all
persons concerned in the commission of a felony, whether they directly commit
the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, though not
present, shall hereafter be prosecuted, tried, and punished as principals, and no
other facts need be alleged in any indictment against such an accessory than are
required in an indictment against his principal.
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I.C. § 19-1430. Finally, Idaho Code § 19-1431 reads, “An accessory to the commission of a
felony may be indicted, tried, and punished, though the principal may be neither indicted nor
tried.” I.C. § 19-1431.
ii.

Idaho Courts Have Held There Is No Distinction Between
Aiders And Abettors And Principals, And The State’s
Burden Of Proof Is The Same

In 2008, the Idaho Supreme Court the Court reasoned, “[t]ogether, I.C. § 18-204 and
I.C. § 19-1430 show a legislative intent to consider defendants as principals whether they
directly committed the crime or aided and abetted in the commission of the crime.” State v.
Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 974 (2008).

In Johnson, the Court held, “In Idaho there is no

distinction between principals and aiders and abettors, and it is unnecessary [that] the charging
document allege any facts other than what is necessary to convict a principal.” Johnson, 145
Idaho at 976.
On numerous occasions the Idaho Supreme Court has affirmed convictions on an aiding
and abetting theory even when the State failed to expressly charge the defendant as an
accomplice. See State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 474, 272 P.3d 417, 446 (2012) (holding
Information charging defendant with killing the victim by purchasing knives and stabbing her, as
set out in a jury instruction, was therefore sufficient to put him on notice that he could be found
guilty as an accomplice in the murder); Johnson, 145 Idaho at 978 (holding that, “Because both
principal and accomplice theories are just different means of proving the underlying charge—
e.g., murder—there are no additional elements the State must prove”); State v. Ayers, 70 Idaho
18, 25-26 (1949) (holding Information was sufficient to put Ayres on trial under either a
principal or accomplice theory, even though it only charged him as a principal).
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As the Idaho Supreme Court has oft held, aiders and abettors are interchangeable with
principals—there are no additional elements the State must prove. Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 464.
Conversely, Mr. Wilson could not have been convicted as a principal under the State’s theory
without making a representation regarding the amount of the methamphetamine, thus he was
required to at least have knowledge of what the amount purported to be.
While there are no Idaho cases addressing the knowledge necessary to convict a
defendant for aiding and abetting in trafficking by represented amount, a fairly recent United
States Supreme Court decision, Rosemond v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1240
(2014), is instructive. The federal aiding and abetting statute at issue in Rosemond was 18
U.S.C. § 2, which provides:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures its commission is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him
or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a
principal.
18 U.S.C. § 2. These provisions, like Idaho law, derives from (and simplifies) common law
standards for accomplice liability. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1245.
In Rosemond, the Court addressed the question of the specific intent required to be
convicted of aiding and abetting the use of a firearm in during a federal drug-trafficking offense
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c). The jury was instructed only on the defendant’s active
participation in the drug trafficking crime. Id. 134 S. Ct. at 1251. The Court reversed the
conviction, holding that the jury should have also been instructed that the defendant must have
known about the gun. Id. The Court held that the jury must find that the “defendant has chosen,
with full knowledge, to participate in the illegal scheme.” Id. at 1250. The Court held that, in
order to convict the defendant under section 924(c), he must have had “advance knowledge” that
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one of his comrades would use or carry a gun as part of the crime's commission, because “a state
of mind extending to the entire crime” is required for conviction of the offense. 134 S.
Ct. at 1245, 1248–49. The language of the federal aiding and abetting statute is similar to
Idaho’s, and a similar decision is warranted here—in order to be convicted of aiding and abetting
trafficking in a certain represented amount, Mr. Wilson must have had advance knowledge of the
amount.
Even co-conspirators must have knowledge of the quantity. In 2007, the Eighth Circuit
decided a case involving the defendant’s knowledge of the quantity of methamphetamine
involved in a distribution conspiracy. United States v. Rolon-Ramos, 502 F.3d 750, 754–55 (8th
Cir. 2007). In Rolon-Ramos, the indictment charged the defendant with conspiracy to distribute
at least 500 grams of methamphetamine, and the jury convicted him of that count. 502 F.3d 750,
754–55. Two of the sections under which he was charged did not require any specific quantity
for conviction; however, the third section required proof of a drug quantity. Id. at 754-755.
The Eighth Circuit reversed the defendant’s conviction as to the drug quantity
determination because the evidence did not support the conviction where the government failed
to establish that actual methamphetamine amounts were ever discussed in the defendant’s
presence by the other co-conspirators.

Id.

It held that none of the inferences that could

reasonably be drawn from the evidence established that the defendant was involved with,
participated in, or could have reasonably foreseen a distribution conspiracy involving more than
500 grams of methamphetamine. 502 F.3d at 756; see also United States v. Hayes, 342 F.3d
385, 391-92 (5th Cir. 2003) (reversing defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to distribute more
than 50 grams of crack cocaine because evidence did not support that quantity, and remanding
with instructions to resentence defendant for conspiracy to distribute more than 5 grams but less
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than 50 grams of crack cocaine); United States v. Gomez-Rosario, 418 F.3d 90, 104 (1st Cir.
2005) (finding that, because no specific drug quantity needs to be proven for a jury to convict a
defendant under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), a defendant may be found guilty of the crime charged, but
responsible for a lesser quantity of drugs than that specified in the indictment).
Because principal and accomplice theories are just different means of proving the
underlying charge, such reasoning requires the aider and abettor to commit the same offense,
with the same elements, as the principal. Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 464. An aider and abettor must
manifest a sharing of the criminal intent of the perpetrator and have acted in some manner to
bring about the intended result. State v. Gonzalez, 134 Idaho 907, 909 (Ct. App. 2000). As
explained in State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 384 (Ct. App. 2008), the aider and abettor must
have the requisite intent required by statute as if he was the principal. If there truly is no
distinction between principals and aiders and abettors, then the aider and abettor must at least
know of the principal’s representation in order to be convicted, because the principal certainly
could not be convicted under subsection (c) without representing an amount.
Here, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction under Count II where there
could be no “community of purpose” absent Mr. Wilson’s knowledge of the amount of substance
Ms. Jones was selling; nor could Mr. Wilson have been convicted as an aider and abettor or a
principal under (c) without evidence that he knew of the amount represented.

b.

The Evidence Was Insufficient To Support Mr. Wilson’s
Conviction Where The Amount Of Methamphetamine Was Never
Represented By The Seller

Mr. Wilson asserts that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support his
conviction of Count II because there is no evidence in the record that demonstrates that
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Ms. Jones affirmatively represented that she was selling Detective Phillips one ounce on
April 27, 2016.
As analyzed in Section a, Idaho law provides two ways in which a person can be
convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine: (1) based on the actual weight of the substance, or
(2) based on the weight “as represented by the person selling or delivering it if the weight as
represented is greater than the actual weight of the controlled substance.” Idaho Code § 372732B(a)(4) (actual weight) and (c) (represented weight).
In this case, the State sought a conviction of Mr. Wilson for Count II based on the
amount as represented by the person selling or delivering it. (Augmentation, p.39 (JI No. 15).)
However, the evidence presented by the State was not sufficient to support a conviction on this
basis, thus, Mr. Wilson respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment of conviction
for Count II.
The evidence was insufficient to support a conviction based on represented weight in
light of the State’s failure to produce any evidence that Ms. Jones2 told Detective Phillips she
was providing him with an “ounce” or an equivalent term of weight used in the illegal drug trade.
See State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389 (Ct. App. 2000) (finding evidence sufficient to support
conviction for trafficking based on represented weight where “the evidence presented to the
jury[] show[ed] that Escobar represented the amount sold to be one ounce”).
The evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict where there was no substantial
evidence upon which the jury could have found the essential element of the weight of the
substance beyond a reasonable doubt.

The substance weighed 25.91 grams (3/1/17 Trial

Tr., p.32, Ls.1-17), less than the 28 grams generally required by the trafficking statute. See
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I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(4). Thus, to prove the essential element of the weight of the substance, the
State had to show under § 37-2732B(c) that Ms. Jones represented that the weight was 28 grams
or more.
Whether Ms. Jones “represented” the weight of the substance within the meaning of the
trafficking statute is an issue of statutory interpretation. Cf. State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389
(Ct. App. 2000).3 The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, over which appellate courts
exercise free review. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829 (2001). The Idaho Supreme Court has
outlined the following rules of statutory interpretation. “The interpretation of a statute must
begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and
ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole.” Verska v. Saint Alphonsus
Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “If the statute is
not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written.”4 Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). “We have consistently held that where statutory language is
unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the
purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The asserted purpose for enacting the legislation cannot modify its plain meaning.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Appellate courts do not have authority to revise or void

2

As discussed in Section I, Mr. Wilson made no representations and there is no evidence he
knew what Ms. Jones was selling or how much she was selling.
3
In Escobar, the Idaho Court of Appeals interpreted I.C. § 37-2732B(c) as “mak[ing] no
distinction between offenses that involve a completed delivery and those that do not.” Escobar,
134 Idaho at 389. According to the Court, “under subsections [(a)(4)] and (c), a defendant may
be convicted of trafficking in methamphetamine if the defendant represented the weight of the
delivered substance to be twenty-eight grams or more, even if the actual weight was less.” Id.
The defendant in Escobar was charged under the methamphetamine trafficking provision of the
trafficking statute before it was renumbered to I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(4). Id. at 388 n.1.
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“an unambiguous statute on the ground that it is patently absurd or would produce absurd results
when construed as written.” Id. at 896. “If the statute as written is socially or otherwise
unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judicial.” Id. at 893 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Title 37 of the Idaho Code does not define “represented.” See I.C. § 37-2701. This does
not mean Section 37-2732B(c) is ambiguous, because the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of
“represented” may be gleaned from other sources.

The most relevant definition of

“representation” from Black’s Law Dictionary provides that a “representation” is “[a]
presentation of fact—either by words or by conduct—made to induce someone to act, esp. to
enter into a contract; esp., the manifestation to another that a fact, including a state of mind,
exists.” Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary’s
most relevant definition of “represent” provides that the term means “to describe as having a
specified

character

or

quality.”

Represent,

Merriam-Webster

Online

Dictionary,

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/represent (last accessed on Feb. 4, 2018.)
Applying the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of “represented” from the above sources
shows that there was insufficient evidence on the weight element because Ms. Jones did not
represent the weight of the substance. Even in the audio recordings of the controlled buys, the
State presented no evidence that Ms. Jones represented the weight of the substance to Detective
Phillips—there are no recorded statements attributed to Ms. Jones regarding the weight of the
methamphetamine sold on April 27, 2016. (See State’s Exhibit No. 9.) It was Detective Phillips’
testimony that he “was supposed to be getting an ounce of Methamphetamine for $600” (2/28/17

4

“A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable
construction. An unambiguous statute would have only one reasonable interpretation.” Verska,
151 Idaho at 896 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Trial Tr., p.212, Ls.8-10); however, there were no statements made during the transaction from
which the jury could infer that Ms. Jones was representing the methamphetamine to weigh an
ounce.5 (See State’s Exhibit No. 9.) Even if Ms. Jones failed to disagree with Detective Phillips’
request, or controvert his assumption that it was the amount he asked for, such acquiescence is
not the affirmative representation that must be established under the statute. It is not Detective
Phillips’ representation of what amount he wanted to purchase—the plain language of the statute
requires the person selling or delivering the substance to “represent” its quantity. I.C. § 372732B(c); Augmentation, p.41 (JI No. 17).) Ms. Jones never presented as fact, through her
words or conduct, that the substance she gave Detective Phillips weighed an ounce (which equals
28.35 grams).

Further, Ms. Jones’ actions in going to the agreed-upon location with the

substance did not represent the weight of the substance. At best, Ms. Jones’ conduct represented
that she had the substance in her possession, but the conduct did not present or describe its
weight. In short, Ms. Jones did not represent the weight of the substance. Thus, there was
insufficient evidence on the weight element to support a conviction of Count II based on
represented weight.

5

Detective Phillips testified that, after he specifically told her that he wanted an ounce,
Ms. Jones “told me that she didn’t have it with her, that she had to go pick it up from Robert’s
house.” (2/28/17 Trial Tr., p.212, Ls.18-23.) Mr. Wilson notes that if the State had merely
called Ms. Jones as a witness it could, presumably, have provided sufficient context by having
her testify as to the terms of her deal with Detective Phillips, including what statements were
made during their unrecorded and unmonitored telephone calls.
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2.

The State Failed To Present Substantial Evidence That Mr. Wilson Knew The
Substance Ms. Jones Was Dealing Was Methamphetamine, Thus Mr. Wilson’s
Convictions On Both Counts Must Be Vacated

Mr. Wilson asserts that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support his
convictions of both counts because the State did not present evidence that Mr. Wilson knew that
the substance Ms. Jones sold to Detective Phillips was methamphetamine.
When interviewed, Mr. Wilson told officers he “go[s] with Regina when she does deals,
whatever. I sit in the car, but I go with her.” (State’s Exhibit No. 5, 11:13:24.) He told them he
receives free “dope” from Regina and sometimes lunch. (State’s Exhibit No. 5, 11:13:30.)
However, “dope” was never identified as meaning “methamphetamine” during the trial, 6 and
officers never sought clarification as to what Mr. Wilson meant by “dope” when speaking to
Mr. Wilson in the interview room. (State’s Exhibit No. 5.)
Because the jury was instructed that the elements of aiding and abetting trafficking
required “the defendant knew it was methamphetamine,” there is insufficient evidence in the
record to support his convictions because there is no evidence in the record that demonstrates
that Mr. Wilson knew Ms. Jones was selling methamphetamine. (Augmentation, pp.39-40 (JI
Nos. 14, 15).)
Ms. Jones’ actions in giving Mr. Wilson “dope” or buying him lunch do not establish that
he knew she was selling methamphetamine. 7 The jury was presented with no evidence that he
knew Ms. Jones sold methamphetamine. Thus, Mr. Wilson’s convictions for two counts of
trafficking in methamphetamine must be vacated.

6

In fact, when asked for the street terms for methamphetamine, Detective Phillips identified,
“shit,” “white,” “white girl,” “crystal,” “ice,” and “glass.”
(2/28/17 Trial Tr., p.174, L.17 –
p.175, L.1.)
7
In fact, “dope” is commonly used to refer to marijuana. Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 213-14
(2016 Ed.) (defining dope as “an illicit, habit-forming, or narcotic drug; esp MARIJUANA”).
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Wilson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions.
DATED this 7th day of February, 2018.

__________/s/_______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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